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THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROFIT
CONCEPT: ONE ORGANIZATION'S
EXPERIENCE
Abstract: The accounting innovation and change literature has emphasized the contingent relationship between the accounting system
and a variety of environmental forces. This paper utilizes a longitudinal analysis to evaluate this contingent relationship within one nineteenth century organization, The Calvin Company. The results generally are consistent with most findings from the literature. In particular, the study examines the shift in the profit concept to a shortversus a long-term perspective. This has parallels with the emerging
role of the corporate form of business organization and the entity, as
opposed to, proprietary view of accounting.
The accounting system shaped the organizational reality to the
extent that the accounting for an event had a subsequent impact
upon The Calvin Company's direction. The conclusions highlight the
contextual nature of accounting. Accounting and accounting change
must be interpreted in terms of the underlying developments within
the entity, and within its external environment.

The accounting change and innovation literature has become the focus of research in accounting history [Bhimani,
1993; Edwards, 1991; Hopewood, 1987]. The present study examines accounting change within the context of one Nineteenth
Century organization, specifically the environmental factors related to the shift in the profit concept from a short- versus a
long-term perspective. The significance granted to the profit
concept evolved in tandem with The Calvin Company's adaptation to the changing business conditions of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. A major aspect of the latter was its
adjustment to the corporate form of business organization. The
paper begins with a chronology of The Calvin Company (TCC)
followed by a literature review, the research framework, analysis, conclusions, and interpretation.
The a u t h o r gratefully acknowledges the helpful c o m m e n t s of D. B.
Thornton, the editor, and the anonymous reviewers, and the research support of
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CALVIN COMPANY
TCC began operations in the 1830s, growing in scale and
scope throughout the nineteenth century to include (among others) shipbuilding, wrecking operations, and towing services. 1
TCC's business enterprises encompassed the several stages
along the supply chain to meet the market demand for primarily
oak timber and, to a lesser extent, staves. Given its varied activities, represented schematically in Appendix 2, TCC's information requirements would differ at alternate points along the supply chain.
At the supply end, TCC had to decide whether to make or
buy its timber, to act solely as a forwarder or to sell also on its
own account, and how to administer its joint ventures and to
finance its operations overall. On the demand side, TCC had
particular information needs, for example, to sell its timber at
Quebec or to ship it directly to Great Britain. Acting as a commission agent, TCC rafted much timber at the risk of other
owners. Thus, it had to determine when it was best to sell, taking into account market conditions, possible commissions and
the potential competition created by its own timber. As well,
TCC had to weigh the strategy of contracting to sell its upcoming production (a precursor of futures contracts) against taking
its chances on the open market.
In 1836, D. D. Calvin moved his base of operations from
Clayton, New York to Garden Island, near Kingston, Canada.
Garden Island offered a strategic location with a good harbor
for b o t h timber storage and raft construction. Timber a n d
staves first were shipped to Garden Island before subsequent
rafting to Quebec, with the rafting season running from late
April until November. In 1839, Calvin entered into a partnership
with John Counter and Hiram Cook, formalizing an existing
string of joint ventures. During this early period, financial concerns predominated as the timber market was slow and credit
was tight. Moreover, the partners had conflicting opinions
about the advisability of continued timber-cutting during a low
market (increasing their risk and holding cost) versus the shipm e n t of timber to Garden Island to keep its vessels in operation.
Counter, discontent with TCC's activities, withdrew from the
partnership at the end of 1843 and the business was reorganized
as Calvin, Cook & Company. At this time, C. E. Dunn entered
1

A time-line of the firm is provided in Appendix 1.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3

2

McWatters: Evolution of the profit concept: One organization's experience

McWatters: The Evolution of the Profit Concept

33

the firm. The new partnership did not operate without discord
and T. H. Dunn replaced his brother at the end of 1844. Subsequent internal debates resulted in a major restructuring of the
firm and a new partnership with T. H. Dunn commenced on
January 1, 1847.
The period from 1845 to 1850 saw the rise of economic
liberalism in Great Britain, which brought both the loss of colonial preference and responsible government to the colonies. The
end of tariff protection in 1846 did not reduce immediately Canadian exports of hewn timber, due to the concurrent upswing
in British demand and the gradual elimination of duties. However, a rush to get shipments to Great Britain before the loss of
preference resulted in an oversupply in the world m a r k e t
[Lower, 1984].
As TCC expanded, the partners' geographic separation reinforced their differing business interests. In 1850, Dunn withdrew and Cook and Calvin divided their holdings. D. D. Calvin's
brother-in-law, Ira A. Breck, purchased a 25 percent interest in
the firm, and Calvin and Cook formally dissolved their partnership at the end of 1854. During the 1850s, TCC faced both good
and bad years, as it dealt with the shortcomings of its market
forecasts and local problems, such as the fear of cholera in 1854
which disrupted timber rafting. TCC's reported profits also were
reduced by its policy of taking major write-downs of assets versus a systematic method of depreciation. This contributed to the
losses of 1858 and 1859.
Correspondence of the 1860s reads much like that of the
1850s. Concern about credit, the tendency to overproduce and
the declining quality of the timber continued throughout the
decade. The correspondence from 1867 easily could be mistaken
for that of 1862 or 1864, were it not for the dates, with the same
issues repeating themselves. In 1868, TCC began to make shipments directly to Great Britain, in sharp contrast to its initial
policy of selling all its timber at Quebec. TCC had considered
shipping "a last resort," and only to be done "under extreme
necessity." By the end of 1869, the partners' capital had grown
to more than $360,000 from $160,000 in 1862 (approximately
12 percent per year).
TCC entered the 1870s as the industry leader in terms of
oak timber (QUA, Box 117, Folder 1), reporting its largest profits in 1871 and 1873. The depressed world market reversed this
positive picture and TCC's reported return dropped by more
Published by eGrove, 1993

3

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 3
34

The Accounting

Historians Journal, December 1993

than 85 percent in 1874, followed in 1875 by its first loss since
1859. TCC broke even in 1876, with additional losses in the last
three years of the decade. TCC persisted in its timber operations, stockpiling considerable inventory. Activities increasingly
were concentrated in the United States, 2 but these operations
did not prove profitable. TCC was left with the risk of real estate
holdings in the United States, and the write-off of considerable
sums due to poor timber quality. In 1879, TCC reported its largest net loss at more than $91,000. At the beginning of 1880,
partners' capital was $316,133.82 compared to $389,479.23 in
1870. As indicated in Appendix 3, this was a drop of 18.83 percent, and a notable decrease from the years 1873 to 1876 in
which their capital had been reported at over $500,000.
In 1880, Breck retired and TCC continued as Calvin & Son.
In 1884, D. D. Calvin died, and the estate was divided among his
heirs. TCC's final years were encompassed in the end of the
square timber trade more generally, as the industry was dominated increasingly by sawn lumber. Incorporated in 1886, TCC
remained a family enterprise, a factor which appeared to constrain its flexibility. The loss of its labor force, transportation
improvements, and a shorter timber season reinforced TCC's
declining profitability, as its facilities and ships were ill-suited
for alternate uses. Operations ceased at the outbreak of World
War I.3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The accounting innovation and change literature has attempted to explain the adaptation of the accounting system to
specific organizational circumstances. There is the frequent assumption that change is beneficial, resulting in a better fit between the organization and its environment. Much of this research has utilized a contingency framework, drawing upon organization theories of organizational structure and change.

2

O p e r a t i o n s in the United States generally were conducted as joint ventures
with individual company agents.
3
It has been suggested that TCC ceased operations with the onset of World
War I [Swainson, 1980]. Examination of minutes of shareholders' and directors'
meetings [QUA, Volume 80], and of company letters [MMA, Letterbook 23 g 24]
imply that the decision was taken much earlier. This included the cancellation
of fortnightly church services at the end of 1913, and the closing of the Garden
Island school in July of 1914.
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While structural contingency theories were popular in organization theory in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, this interest has
diminished in recent years, especially with the emergence of
other perspectives such as; organizational ecology, institutional
theory and organizational economics. However, contingency research remains popular in accounting, especially in the area of
budgetary control [Merchant, 1984], budget-related behavior
[Williams et al, 1990], accounting information system design
[Kim, 1988] and strategy [Simons, 1987]. Early studies in both
organization theory and accounting posited mere congruence
theories and lacked a link between organizational fit and organizational effectiveness. The rudimentary notion was that structure was contingent upon contextual factors, thus variations in
the two were related [Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Otley and
Wilkinson, 1988].
In some ways, the ecological (natural selection) and institutional (managerial selection) perspectives justify congruence.
The former views fit as an evolutionary process of adaptation
wherein only the best-performing organizations survive. It is
also more pessimistic, as organizations are subject to structural
inertia due to internal and external pressures for stability. The
institutional view takes into account micro and macro levels of
organizational design, but also constraints in terms of practices
and prescriptions imposed by institutional forces [Drazin and
Van de Ven, 1985, pp. 516-17]. More complete formulations of
contingency theory have emphasized the notion of fit between
the organization and its environment [Drazin and Van de Ven,
1985; Gresov, 1989; Kim, 1988]. Pennings [1992] has described
the latter as the equifinality view as opposed to the determinism
inherent in the natural and managerial selection approaches.
Contextual variables have been classified broadly in terms
of three categories: organizational size, technology, and environment. In turn, these factors are hypothesized to influence
the organization and its accounting and information system.
Organizational size was utilized by Bruns and Waterhouse
[1975] in their study of budgetary control. Increasing size was
correlated to greater structure in activity and decentralization of
control. Merchant [1981, 1984] also included the effect of size in
the adoption of alternate control strategies. Increased size led to
greater decentralization and reduced interaction amongst subordinates and superiors. Greater reliance upon procedures and
paperwork also was noted, supporting earlier work by Gordon
Published by eGrove, 1993
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and Miller [1976]. There is some debate, however, whether size
is a contingent variable, or whether it is within the organization's control and relatively fixed in the short term.
Technology has been included within contingency research
beginning with Woodward's [1965] studies of workflow and
structure. A number of studies have incorporated technological
effects on accounting system design. A difficulty has been the
varied concepts of technology utilized. For example, technology
has been characterized alternatively in terms of production inputs, transformation and outputs.
W i t h i n a c c o u n t i n g , technology has been theorized by
W a t e r h o u s e a n d Tiessen [1978] in t e r m s of technological
routineness and environmental predictability. More recent empirical studies by Merchant [1984, 1985] define technology as
the level of automation and predictability of the production process. Kim [1988] and Williams et al [1990] adopt Thompson's
concept of departmental interdependency. Given that technological c h a n g e c o n t r i b u t e s to e n v i r o n m e n t a l u n c e r t a i n t y ,
Pennings [1992] has argued that the former should be subsumed within the broader category of environment.
Environmental uncertainty has been included in contingency studies beginning with the seminal work of Burns and
Stalker [1961] and Lawrence and Lorsch [1967]. Gordon and
N a r a y a n a n [1984] included perceived environmental uncertainty in terms of the impact upon organizational structure (organic/mechanistic) and the type of accounting information system utilized. Govindarajan [1984, p. 127] emphasized environmental uncertainty, defining the latter as "the unpredictability
in the actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups that comprise the external environment of the
business unit." Gordon and Miller [1976] subdivided environmental uncertainty in terms of environmental dynamism, heterogeneity and hostility, whereas Amigoni [1978] classified it
w i t h respect to turbulence a n d discontinuity. K h a n d w a l l a
[1972] dealt specifically with the level of competition facing the
individual firm. Again, these different ways to operationalize the
construct have led to confused and often weak results from empirical studies.
An event-history analysis of the California wine industry by
Delacroix and Swaminathan [1991] united a number of these
related concepts together as environmental variation: the degree
of environmental uncertainty, the amplitude of change in the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3
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environment and the frequency of this change. Although the
authors adopted an ecological approach, the study examined the
question of adaptive organizational change and the impact of
the latter upon organizational survival. Moreover, survival was
distinguished from performance. The former being a necessary
precondition for organizational fitness and the latter denoting
preparedness for future action.
Haveman [1992] studied organizational change in the savings and loan industry in the United States, under the assumption that environmental change occurs at the same rate for all
organizations in the population. A motivation for the study was
the paradox within ecological theory that change increases the
risk of failure, but that organizational change is nonetheless
a b u n d a n t [Haveman, 1992, p .53]. Haveman focused on changes
in the organizational domain; domain being defined as the clients served, goods and services provided, and technologies utilized. Two changes affecting the savings and loan industry have
parallels to TCC: first, technological innovation, including the
speed of information processing, which increased economies of
scale and scope; second, macroeconomic change with respect to
shifts in the money supply and the volatility of financial credit.
The two are not disjoint. Technological change, coupled with
deregulation, enhanced competition, reduced profit margins,
and increased overall environmental uncertainty.
Organizational culture often has been overlooked in contingency studies, although its influence was included by Flamholtz
[1983] in the framework of the overall organizational control
system. The relationship between accounting and culture recently has received more interest, wherein organizational culture incorporates the shared values of the organization as embodied in the control system. Importantly, culture includes the
selection and socialization process [Van Maanen & Schein,
1979] and power relations [Markus and Pfefffer, 1983]. Cultural
factors have been recognized in studies of nineteenth century
Canadian business [Bliss, 1987; McCalla, 1979, 1984]. Business
relations and social ties frequently reinforced each other. Trust
was the key factor in the granting of credit, for example, especially when market contractions occurred. McCalla [1984, p. 18]
has described the nineteenth century business environment as
"competitive yet mutually supporting." This description is similar to Ouchi's [1979, 1980] view that cultural or clan mechanisms reduce conflicts between individual and organizational
Published by eGrove, 1993

7

38

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 3

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1993

goals, promoting a sense of community. Moreover, clan mechanisms are preferable in terms of lower transaction costs as opposed to market and bureaucratic control systems.
Many studies into organizational and accounting change
have demonstrated weak results. This has been due, in part, to
inadequate data and mis-specification of the contextual variables. Dent [1990] suggests that the lack of compelling results
also stems from the deterministic implications of these contingency theories. Likewise, Simons [1987, 1990] asserts the need
for a more voluntaristic position, especially in relation to organizational strategy. Strategy previously has been included in
studies by Khandwalla [1972] and Govindarajan and Gupta
[1985]. This study does not incorporate strategy, but does examine the dynamic process through which innovation and change
occurs. The longitudinal nature of the research mitigates a limitation of cross-sectional studies by examining processes and
accounting's implication in the perception of organizational
possibilities.
The foregoing review demonstrates that the current paper is
grounded in an established literature, but also contributes to it
by emphasizing longitudinal processes. Thus, the paper should
be of interest to not only accounting historians, but also accounting and organizational researchers examining the issues of
(accounting) innovation and change.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
TCC's history has been divided into two periods. During the
first phase (1839 to 1869), the company commenced operations,
growing in both scale and scope, primarily within Canada. The
second phase (1870 to 1915) incorporated TCC's diversification
efforts into the United States, the increasing importance of nontimber freighting, and the wind-up of its operations. The two
periods have been determined ex post based upon the presence
of management accounting information during TCC's second
phase.
Data Sources
The source materials utilized in this r e s e a r c h c a n be
grouped into three categories. Each of these categories are described in the following paragraphs.
The Calvin Company Records contained at the Queen's University Archives, Kingston, Canada comprise the primary rehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3
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s e a r c h d a t a . These d o c u m e n t s e n c o m p a s s r e c o r d s of t h e
company's timber, ship-building, salvage and towing operations;
along with records pertaining to family and personal legal matters. The catalogue lists 256 bound volumes and 136 boxes, arranged according to the main group or category, as well as
chronologically.
The Queen's University collection is strengthened by its
smaller counterpart, The Calvin Collection, archived at The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes, Kingston, Canada. The latter
contains nine boxes of chronologically-ordered records of a persona] and business nature, as well as a large number of bound
volumes of company and personal records. Since the Marine
M u s e u m p r i m a r i l y contains records of the Garden Island
branch, it fills significant gaps within the Queen's University
collection.
Publications dealing with TCC's history have served as a
starting point to determine critical events in the company's life.
These sources have been used with caution, given that many
have been written by family members. A wide spectrum of published materials in both accounting and Canadian economic history has been consulted to provide the necessary contextual
background. A list of these sources is included in the References.
Data Analysis
The evolution of TCC underscores a variety of economic
and social factors which affected and were affected by its operations. The cross-temporal comparison of the accounting system
in TCC's two phases seeks to uncover clues with respect to
TCC's evolution, and with respect to environmental changes
which are linked to the former. Based upon the review of the
existing literature and an evaluation of TCC's own chronology,
the following contextual variables potentially had an impact
upon TCC's activities, and upon its internal accounting system:
(1) Organizational size — the greater scope of the business,
including the geographic dispersion of the partners,
and of their agents.
(2) Technological innovation — advances in the timber industry which fed back into the company's operations,
and influenced its methods to account for them.
(3) Macroeconomic change — shifts in financial credit and
the profit focus, especially due to the shortened operating cycle in the timber industry.
Published by eGrove, 1993
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(4) Organizational culture — the importance of family connections to provide for stewardship and accountability,
and to reduce problems of agency, thus making explicit
contracts less important.
THE PROFIT CONCEPT IN FOCUS
The transformation from bookkeeping to accounting has
been described by Littleton [1966, p. 165] as the shift from "a
mere method of systematically recording exchanges into a
means of giving business management an effective control over
its affairs." Included in this transformation has been a shift
from a long- to a short-run profit concept. Initially, profit denoted the increase in net assets over time, but this view has
been replaced by the focus upon the difference in net assets
between two points in time. The change relates to two accounting developments at the end of the nineteenth century: the
emergence of the entity, in contrast to the proprietary, view of
accounting and the concept of the periodic income of a goingconcern. Both are related to the rise of the corporate form of
business organization [Littleton, 1966, pp. 165-221; MacNeal,
1970, pp. 292-295].4 This altered emphasis emerged in TCC, as it
adapted to the business conditions of the late nineteenth century. One aspect of the latter was TCC's adjustment to the corporate form of business organization.
TCC operated within an environment in which communications were slow, and often faulty. Decisions were taken with a
long-term perspective, which influenced the nature of the business enterprise. The nineteenth century concepts of periodicity
and profit cannot be equated with the timely reporting of yearly
income. The determination of profit envisaged a longer time
horizon with profit calculation made at the wind-up of individual ventures, or the liquidation of a business enterprise. The
partners operated jointly to augment their personal wealth, the
evaluation of their success to be made only at the dissolution of
the partnership. Economic circumstances weighed heavily upon
their ultimate success or failure, but little could be done to influence such events. Instead, TCC rode out the market fluctuations in a never-ending quest for credit, and for new avenues of
4
This statement is not intended to suggest that the entity concept was unknown before this time. Rather, its roots can be traced to the venture system of
accounting which was prevalent in the fifteenth century.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3

10

McWatters:
Evolutionofofthethe
profit
concept: One organization's experience
McWatters:
The Evolution
Profit
Concept
41
commercial endeavor. The formal partnerships were based
upon a commercial system grounded in concepts of trust, stewardship, and the accountability of the firm's individual members
[Bliss, 1987; McCalla, 1979].
This long-term perspective was incorporated into b o t h
TCCs Articles Of Agreement, and the operation of its accounting
system. The former set out the copartnership terms, including
the calculation of and the allocation of profit. The agreement
provided the initial basis for partnership valuation, as well as
the contractual basis for wealth-sharing at final dissolution. It
also ensured that the partners did not operate in conflict with,
or in competition with, their mutual interests. The opening of
branch offices and the geographic dispersion of the partners
reinforced this need for accountability.
The Articles Of Agreement [MMA 980.150.82] b e t w e e n
Calvin, Cook and Counter stated "that all gains, profits and increase arising from the said joint Trade and business shall from
time to time during the term of Copartnership be equally and
proportionally divided between the said Copartnership share
and share alike and that also all such losses as shall appear in
the said joint business . . . " Profit would be determined by the
rendering of accounts by the copartners related to all "receipts
and disbursements and all other things whatsoever done or suffered by them in the said joint business . . . " The document was
not specific about either the timing of profit, other than "from
time to time", or, about the length of the partnership. These
points were clarified in the next two agreements.
When C. E. Dunn entered at January 1844, the Articles Of
Agreement [MMA 980.150.176] stipulated "that all gains, profits
and increase arising from said Trade and business shall be divided at the expiration of the term as herein provided of said
Copartnership, in proportion to their respective stock or share
in said business or Trade. And that also all the loss or losses
which may accrue or arise from said business . . . shall be
borne, in proportion to their respective shares in said business,
by the said parties." The term of the partnership was set as five
years from the date of the contract, unless otherwise dissolved
as provided for in the agreement. Dunn entered the partnership
with no capital contribution; a "free-rider" in that he was to
receive a proportionate share of partnership increases and decreases. Differences between the accounting records and the
Statement Of Affairs (SOA) upon which the partnership valuaPublished by eGrove, 1993
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tion had been determined suggest that the accounting system
could not be relied upon for wealth allocation, and that any
Profit and Loss (P&L) balance would not be an accurate estimate of partnership wealth.
The third Articles of Agreement between D. D. Calvin, H.
Cook and T. H. Dunn [MMA 980.150.221] had more stringent
accountability provisions related to partnership shares and responsibilities. Greater emphasis upon the accounting system as
an interim measure of both stewardship and accountability was
observed. It also specified the term of the copartnership, at the
end of which profits or losses would be divided according to the
partners' individual shares — five-twelfths each for Calvin and
Cook, and two-twelfths for Dunn. It limited withdrawals by individual partners to a monthly allowance, and eliminated their
authority to extend credit. These enhancements to both the accounting system and the contractual agreement sought to maintain the accountability of the partners which had been the major feature of the 1839 agreement.
Given the partnership contract, there was no requirement
to calculate profit or loss on a systematic (such as yearly) basis,
since the final gain or loss would be declared upon dissolution
of the joint business. The partners were required to present an
annual report of the transactions undertaken related to the joint
ventures, but this did not require that any interim profit or loss
be divided amongst them. For example, at the end of the Calvin,
Cook & Counter partnership (December 1843), the overall profit
of the ventures, as stated in the second SOA was £12,223
($48,892) [MMA 980.150.174]. Importantly, the 1843 valuation
could not have been made from the accounting records alone,
but necessitated the use of the SOA. The SOA valuation was a
mixture of book records and current value estimates. The latter
were provided by various businessmen called upon with respect
to specific assets, such as schooners and real estate. Receivables
were stated at their net realizable value, with deductions made
for estimated losses. Shipments in transit, and inventory on
hand, were recorded at net realizable value, with allowance for
estimated expenses to be incurred. In short, these accounting
estimates of c u r r e n t value were a surrogate for prices in
present-day equity markets.
Including the sum attributed to goodwill, Counter's onethird share (£5,000) was debited to the P&L account, while reducing his liability to the firm. As noted by Littleton [1966, p.
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167], the calculation of profit as the net difference between assets a n d liabilities emphasized the nineteenth century view
which equated profit with an increase in capital. Thus, the SOA
determined the return of capital to the partners. Although it was
used only infrequently during the period from 1839 to 1869
(rather than to determine the outcome of individual ventures),
the SOA provided the overall valuation of the joint ventures
comprising the partnership. During the second phase, the SOA
calculated return on capital, and allocated owners' equity between capital and profit. It was prepared yearly upon TCC's
incorporation in 1886. The SOA was the formal document with
which to determine the respective shares of the individual partners, initially at dissolution, and yearly once the firm attained
limited-liability status.
From 1839 to 1850, the accounting system did not record
profit in each year. The P&L Account was balanced at the end
of 1840, 1841 and 1842. These amounts were not transferred
elsewhere in the accounts, and the P&L Account was set back to
zero. When J. Counter withdrew, the P&L Account was not balanced at all. The £5,000 value placed on a one-third interest
formed the valuation basis for contracting when a new partnership was established in January 1844. The subsequent partnership began with a capital stock of £15,000, and C. E. Dunn was
expected to pay £2,500 for his one-sixth share.
When the second copartnership began in 1844, and continuing with the third agreement from 1846 to 1849, the P&L
balance was carried forward each year. Only at the end of 1849
was this amount transferred to the Stock Account. The dissolution of the partnership in June 1850, concurrent with D. D.
Calvin's and H. Cook's agreement to divide their interest, eliminated the balance of the P&L Account. 5 The shares of the individual partners were determined by the evaluation of their joint
property. Calvin and Cook accepted responsibility for the assets
and liabilities of their respective operations, along with the
transfer by Calvin to Cook of the former's share in certain assets.
5

Calvin and Cook operated in outward form as a partnership, yet in substance were two separate businesses. This was formally recognized in 1854. The
two partners did not wish to dissolve their arrangement formally in 1850, since
the change at Quebec and additional changes at Hamilton and Garden Island
might have been perceived as instability in their operations [QUA and MMA
Calvin Company correspondence].
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Thus, the long-term view of profit was reinforced by the
partners' own attitude and conduct, and also by the Articles of
Agreement which established the means for profit calculation
and allocation. Each copartnership terminated with the overall
evaluation of assets and liabilities. Profit was declared as the
increase in net assets over time.
When Ira A. Breck entered the business in 1851, the value
of his share was determined to be £2,606.11.6 (adjusted to
£3,549.12. 6 in March 1853 to correct earlier recording errors).
This amount represented one quarter of D. D. Calvin's equity,
calculated as the difference between the assets and liabilities of
Calvin Cook & Company at December 31, 1850. Despite the
introduction of a yearly profit number at this time, the concept
of profit was not altered significantly. The profit or loss was
mingled with other amounts in the Stock Account, and essentially was absorbed into capital. The shortcomings of this procedure were beginning to emerge — without the timely allocation
of profit, there existed no method for Breck to pay for his partnership share.
In February 1860, journal entries (totalling $43,182.72) recognized the division of the business at January 1851. Entries
allocated on a 75/25 basis the balance in the Stock Account
resulting from profits and losses since 1851, and adjusted for
Breck's salary during these years. The allocation of profit on a
yearly basis according to the partners' capital shares provided
Breck with a capital source with which to reduce his outstanding liability. The change culminated in greater attention to the
yearly profit figure. The value placed upon Breck's share in 1851
was calculated from the value of the assets and liabilities, as
recorded in the accounting records. This was a break from the
earlier years when the latter were not relied upon for such valuations, thus creating the initial need for the SOA.
Beginning in 1860, the profit figure was both calculated and
allocated at the year-end closing of the books. Nonetheless, the
allocation did not imply that profit was considered to be shortterm in nature, i.e., similar to the nineteenth century concept of
income calculated on a going-concern basis. These changes also
simplified the preparation of a balance sheet, yet there is no
evidence that such a document was utilized. It probably was not
necessary, since the two partners were in close contact with
each other, and with business operations. The year-end closing
procedures remained basically the same, although the system to
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allocate transactions became much more complex as TCC expanded. While each individual account still was treated as a
separate fund, one such account would be allocated to several
others before a final profit or loss was determined. This had the
effect of decreasing the potential information content of the final profit or loss figure from an individual venture. The transfer
of costs from one account to another could create a gain in one
account at the expense of others, contingent upon the transfer
price used. For example, the company store and bakehouse generally showed a profit each year, yet this gain resulted from
sales primarily made to TCC's operating departments. While the
need for a balance sheet was not apparent during the first phase
of TCC, this situation changed in the second phase, when the
balance sheet assumed an important role within the reporting
system.
TCC had to deal with changes in both its internal and external environment throughout the 1870s. In 1871, the entry of
Calvin's son, H i r a m , m e a n t that profit was to be divided
amongst three individuals. Hiram assumed a 25 percent interest
in 1873, which unfortunately for him corresponded with the
downturn in the world timber market. 6
The preparation of a balance sheet was mentioned in a letter dated January 1872, written by Hiram to his father [MMA
980.150.280], and its preparation in 1870 can be inferred from
other archival documents. The General Ledger indicates that the
balancing of the P&L account was undertaken in two steps: an
initial balancing determined the period's profit or loss, prior to
the drawing of partners' salaries. The second step recorded the
latter amount, such that the final profit, net of salaries, was
revealed. Although this two-stage balancing appears to have
been dropped in subsequent years, its use in 1870 may be explained by the increase in the salaries of Calvin and Breck from
$3,000 to $5,000 each per annum. The payment of a yearly salary, in lieu of interest on their respective capital shares, had
been confirmed in an agreement dated December 25, 1871
[MMA 980.150.973]. Hiram Calvin's interest in the 1871 profit
probably was related to his entry into the business at this time.
He was to receive 75 percent of the profit from the operation of
the government tug-line service.

6
This was especially unfortunate, since Hiram had agreed to finance his
share with yearly payments with interest calculated at 6 percent.
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The profit n u m b e r s , which had been rising during the
1860s and early 1870s, were transformed into heavy losses. Significantly, TCC retained its long-term perspective, essentially
continuing to make timber, build ships, and to operate its other
facilities in the belief that the tide eventually would turn. At the
end of 1879, the firm's stock of unsold oak lying in various
Quebec coves amounted to 1,774,000 feet [Box 135, Folder 7,
1878-79]. With Hiram Calvin's withdrawal from the partnership
in 1877, it was possible for the two remaining partners to absorb the heavy losses.
While TCC attempted to cushion itself from sagging timber
markets, and changing business conditions (such as increased
competition in rafting, the shift from wood to coal fuel, and
from ship to rail transport, the need to adapt became obvious in
the 1880s. At Breck's withdrawal, the long-term view prevailed
for the last time. The accounting for this change affirmed that
the two partners were to arrive at a final calculation of their
profits over the period from 1851 to 1880. The Articles Of Agreement [MMA 980.150.976] of April 1880, which established the
terms of Breck's retirement, provided for the transfer by Breck
to Calvin of the former's interests in the firm, except for specified assets. Breck also was to receive $12,500 with interest at six
percent per a n n u m on the unpaid balance. In total, Breck received assets valued at $33,000 compared to his initial capital
interest of $14,199. The balance of $29,702 in Breck's Capital
Account was declared a profit, which suggests that his interest
had been overstated. Despite the yearly division of profit from
1851 to 1879, the final determination of this gain was made
only at partnership dissolution.
Hiram Calvin reentered the business upon Breck's retirement. The Indenture [MMA 980.150.726] between Hiram and
his father stated that the former would receive a six percent
payment on his Capital Stock as at April 1880 ($22,055.04), plus
a yearly salary of $2,500. All profits or losses would accrue to D.
D. Calvin.
While this arrangement may have been sufficient while D.
D. Calvin was alive and head of the business, it was not adequate once his death cast the future course of TCC into doubt.
Equally, the profit concept proved inadequate once the corporate form of business was adopted in 1886. Littleton [1966, p.
217] has described this inadequacy as follows:
But for a going concern the final facts are not yet availhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3
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able; it does not suffice to consider values (assets and
liabilities) as if in liquidation, nor to use current values,
for in both cases there is a lack of reality in the resulting calculation of profit because of the lack of actuality
of the values used. The modern problem has come to
be viewed as the problem of ascertaining income rather
than profit; that is to say, the need at present is to
distinguish between operating income and capital increments.
The year-end procedure whereby profit was transferred to
the partners' capital accounts did not suffice once TCC was organized as a corporation, with contributed capital and the potential for both dividends and surplus. The situation also underscored TCC's need to move from a family business to the
consideration of the family and the business as two separate
entities.
At this juncture, the SOA reappeared in a much different
format. The SOA next was used in 1884 in connection with the
settlement of D. D. Calvin's estate. 7 Upon incorporation in 1886,
D. D. Calvin's heirs transferred to TCC their interest in the business assets in return for a cash settlement or shares of the new
enterprise. Initially, TCC had to finance the share purchase, as
their only collateral was their interest in the very assets now
transferred to the firm. The new corporation issued capital
shares in the amount of $157,500 (1,575 shares with a par-value
of $100 each). TCC was required to distinguish clearly capital
and profit, as capital had to be maintained, i.e., no dividends
could be paid from issued capital. Corporate status legally required the presentation of an annual report to shareholders,
thus the SOA was prepared yearly in a more detailed and formal
manner. Of particular note was the linkage of the amounts recorded in the SOA with those recorded in the General Ledger.
The SOA summarized the ledger entries for each account such
that all gains and losses could be traced to their original source.
The SOA also reinforced the duality of the accounting system,
since it arrived at a profit number by the examination of individual accounts while the P&L Account yielded this same figure
by an alternate route. The SOA clarified when such gains were

7
The settlement was not finalized for a number of years, given the mingling
of the estate with company operations.
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from capital or operations, which the P&L Account did not dif
ferentiate. Since issued capital stock was constant at $157,500,
the SOA provided a means to divide owners' equity between
profit m a d e in the course of business operations versus in
creases in capital. Yet TCC's continued use of a fund system for
its long-lived assets potentially could have obscured the differ
ence between profits (or losses) arising from operations rather
than from the valuation or liquidation of assets.
Additionally, the SOA indicated whether any profit led to a
dividend payment or a contribution to a capital surplus. Two
features of TCC's dividend policy are noteworthy. First, except
for the year 1891, TCC declared a yearly dividend from 1888 to
1907. However, five of the nineteen payments were made, in
whole or in part, by drawing down the Surplus Account. Sec
ond, the payment of a cash dividend implied the need for in
creased credit or for the liquidation of an asset. Only in 1894
did TCC possess adequate cash resources to cover the dividend
payment. A comparison of TCC's dividend payments to the cur
rent (and most liquid) assets of cash and bills receivable indi
cates that the dividend exceeded these liquid assets from 15.10
to 858.66 percent. 8
TCC's dividend policy also contributed to the erosion of its
capital base. During the period from 1887 to 1915, TCC had
total gains of $172,827 of which it paid out 76.59 percent in
dividends 9 . This left the firm without adequate funds to invest in
new technology, let alone to finance ongoing operations. The
balance sheets from 1887 to 1915 trace TCC's decline during
this period. The company moved from a surplus to a deficit
situation in 1911. From 1887 to 1915, TCC showed a profit in 22
of 29 years. However, this profit as a percentage of issued capi
tal ranged from a low of 0.20 percent in 1887 to a high in 1890
of 21.22 percent. Losses were much higher in percentage terms,
ranging from 6.47 percent in 1908 to 50.21 percent in 1914. The
balance sheets also indicate the decrease in net assets from
$157,812,42 in 1887 to $11,966.16 in 1915. At the end of 1915,
the deficit account equalled 92.02 percent of paid up capital. 10
8

The average of the excess in these years was 169.93 percent (standard
deviation σ = 222.09, n = 19).
9
TCC's dividend policy and its financial impact are summarized in Appendi
ces 4 and 5.
10
This percentage was 96.56% in 1919, the last year for which financial
statements have been located in the archival records.
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This dividend policy could be considered a good strategy from
the viewpoint of the firm and the entrepreneur jointly. TCC possibly was liquidated gradually for reinvestment or consumption
by the owners.
As stated earlier, the concept of profit evolved during the
company's life from the calculation of return of capital to the
determination of return on capital — a stock versus a flow concept. Before incorporation, the balance sheet calculated profit
as the net value of assets. It reinforced the nineteenth century
view of profit as an increase in capital, as the yearly gain or loss
was absorbed into the partners' capital accounts. This reflected
TCC's long-run focus and the proprietary view of accounting.
The accounting equation was Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Equity. This view was evident at Breck's retirement in 1880 at
which point the partnership's profit (return of capital) could be
determined.
Moreover, when the SOA was employed in 1842 and 1843
(and possibly 1850), its primary objective was the calculation of
the return of partners' capital. It established the change in
wealth over time — the return of capital. The latter was a stock
concept, as it assessed the increase in net assets over time. Since
the partnership agreements called for the division of profit at
the end of the various joint ventures, it was simply a matter of
calculating the difference in net assets (assets less liabilities)
over time. This difference was owners' capital. A profit was declared if this amount exceeded the original contribution made
by the partners. For example, at the end of 1843, a profit was
considered to have been made 11 , but no estimation of the rate of
profit or of the rate of return on capital was made. Further,
there was no assessment of the decrease in this return during
the period from 1842 to 1843. Profit was a long-term concept,
and only deemed to have been realized upon termination of the
partnership.
Subsequent to incorporation in 1886, the SOA returned in
an altered format to calculate the return on capital — a flow
concept. It focused on the short run, and the profit made in a
single year, which permitted the profit of a single period to be
related and compared to that of other periods. The SOA indicated the allocation of profit between surplus and dividends, or
the payment of dividends via a reduction in the surplus account.

11

Counter's award of £5,000 exceeded his initial contribution of £3,000.

Published by eGrove, 1993

19

50

Accounting Historians Journal,
Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 3
The Accounting Historians Journal, December

1993

Additionally, the SOA provided the return-on-capital figure,
since the issued capital was constant at $157,500. TCC's management did evaluate the return on capital (ROC) for the period
from 1888 to 1913 [MMA, Letterbook 23, pp. 728-729]. Over this
26 year period, TCC paid an average dividend of $5,088.45 per
year. This represented a ROC of 3.23 percent per year. The report further indicated the total gains and losses were
$179,183.91, an average gain of $3,041.69 per year. The evaluation of the total profit over a 26 year period suggests that TCC
had not shifted completely from a long-run profit to a yearly
income figure. Moreover, the indicated average gain represented
a ROC of only 1.93 percent. In contrast, the dividend payment
was greater, ranging from two to six percent of issued capital.
However, TCC's actual rate of return was more variable, ranging
from a loss of 29.24 percent to a gain of 21.22 percent. 12 It is not
unlikely that this evaluation, along with a further loss in 1913,
motivated the decision to wind-up operations in March 1914.
Interestingly, it was also in 1914 that TCC replaced the SOA
with a Profit & Loss Statement.
The shift to a limited-liability company did not enhance
TCC's viability, as family members did not distinguish TCC
from the estate of D. D. Calvin. The payment of dividends over
the period from 1888 to 1907, instead of the reinvestment of
funds, led to the erosion of the firm's capital base. The short-run
fixation made it more difficult for TCC to invest the capital
required to position itself as a forwarder in markets other than
square timber. As noted by H. Calvin in a letter to his brotherin-law dated September 1886 [QUA, Volume 26, Folio 67], it
might have been preferable for Hiram to have purchased the
assets of the business, rather than to deal with the varied interests of family members and other shareholders. In time, Calvin
became the majority shareholder, but this alone did not reverse
the firm's fortunes.
CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION
Studies of organizational and accounting change have examined the impact of various contextual variables upon the organization and its accounting system. Parallels can be drawn
with TCC's own experience. In broad terms, TCC's accounting
12
The analysis of TCC's profitability for the years 1887 to 1915 is presented
in Appendix 6.
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system moved from a recorder of events to a system which
would provide the means to control its operations.
It has been hypothesized [Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975;
Merchant, 1981, 1984] the organizational size influences the accounting system, especially in terms of standardization and
complexity. TCC's case reinforces this argument. During TCC's
early years, accounts were not kept in a timely m a n n e r and
were closed variously, depending upon the circumstances of the
individual venture. The accounting records were not relied upon
for partnership valuation, as the former were incomplete. The
dissolution of the first partnership in 1843 was based upon the
SOA prepared by an arbitrator. Similarly, the partners' respective shares at the dissolution in June 1850 resulted from a negotiated settlement, as was the division of assets between Calvin
and Cook.
Over time, reliance upon the accounting records increased,
as they became more systematic. The accounting system's role
was enhanced by the growing concern for partners' accountability, and by their geographic dispersion. Moreover, various contracts for partnerships, and joint operations were tied to the
accounting records for profit determination. For example, the
value of Breck's share at 1851 was derived from the recorded
values in the accounting records, whereas previous partnerships
had used current-value estimates made by partners and outside
arbitrators. In the initial years, agency concerns appeared to
outweigh those pertaining to the relevance of these estimates.
This interpretation lends support to the findings of Gordon and
Miller [1976] and Merchant [1981, 1984] that increased organizational size leads to greater reliance upon an administrative
control strategy and more formal patterns of communication.
The a c c o u n t i n g system also was affected by i n t e r n a l
changes. In December of 1846, the reorganization of the partnership brought a concurrent reorganization of the accounting
records to include the valuation of its net assets, and the recording of the partners' respective shares. In 1860, the calculation of
the partners' capital accounts changed, including the yearly allocation of profit.
As TCC entered its second phase, emphasis upon the accounting system increased, as the yearly profit calculation was
granted greater significance. This situation parallelled changes
in the internal organization, especially the entry into the firm of
H.A. Calvin in the early 1870s. The accounting system exPublished by eGrove, 1993
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panded to provide better control of TCC's operations, as they
grew in scale and scope. As noted, the growth of the firm also
led to improved methods to account for the partners' capital
interest. Again, this effect of size is consistent with earlier findings of Bruns and Waterhouse [1975] and Merchant [1981,
1984].
Interestingly, TCC also provides a counter-example in terms
of decreased reliance on the accounting system as the organization contracted. The later years saw the streamlining of the accounting system in tandem with that of TCC's operations. Summary accounts were employed, along with the less frequent recording of events. This tendency to infrequent reporting prevailed during the economic downturn of the 1870, as well as
when operations declined in the twentieth century. Thus it may
be beneficial to explore further the role of the accounting syst e m in organizational decline, in terms of the information
which the system generates and how this information is utilized.
Haveman [1992] has examined whether
macroeconomic
change, which leads to organizational change, proves beneficial
in terms of the organization's subsequent performance and
changes for survival. The results of the study provide some support for the proposition that "diversification is beneficial if it
builds on competences developed by operating in the organizational d o m a i n and h a z a r d o u s if it is not related to those
competences [p. 71]." TCC also confronted m a c r o e c o n o m i c
change in terms of a shortened operating and financial cycle,
and an increased reliance on external financing.
For example, to reduce the need for short-term financing,
TCC moved from a partnership to a corporation. Incorporation
resulted in a legal requirement to provide a balance sheet, along
with changes in the latter's composition to account for issued
capital and surplus. Profit no longer could be absorbed into
capital at year end, but the separation of the two was required.
The yearly preparation of this information potentially contributed to the short-run focus, as revealed by TCC's decisions to
emphasize the results of the current year, in contrast to its longterm viability.
These alterations also were necessary theoretically to deal
with the altered meaning of the profit concept. The emergent
concept was linked more closely to the present concept of income — the periodic profit of a going-concern [Littleton, 1966].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3
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While the calculation of profit brought together the related concepts of efficiency and effectiveness, it increasingly shifted
TCC's attention to the short-term profit number. This view was
reinforced by the existence of shareholders who were not actively involved in the business. The former were concerned with
the potential for and the payment of their annual dividend. This
concern may have differed from that of others, such as H.
Calvin, who had been active in the firm, and continued to manage it. The heterogeneity of interests reduced TCC's ability to
pursue opportunities, and to implement plans to ensure the
continued success of the business.
During TCC's later years, the balance sheet also tracked the
firm's decline. While its yearly preparation indicated the impact
of the past year's results and provided a starting point to plan
future operations, TCC's management did not seem to be sensitive to the information in its accounting reports, including the
obvious need to reverse the erosion of its capital base. This
insensitivity was reinforced by the format adopted in the accounts, which reported the growing deficit as a debit item,
rather t h a n as a reduction in capital.
Upon incorporation, the SOA (like the balance sheet) was
legally required under the terms of TCC's bylaws. Initially, the
information had been prepared to meet these reporting requirements. Yet, with the use of the SOA, the importance of timing
and of periodicity began to emerge. The SOA did not merely
record the company's financial situation, it also permitted management to ascertain where gains and losses were being made.
However, TCC did not succeed in the shift from a family business to a business enterprise, i.e., a shift from the proprietary to
the entity view of the business and of the accounting for it, such
that the information was not utilized to its potential. Instead,
the payment of dividends appeared to be of more concern,
rather t h a n the impact of these payments upon TCC's capital
base.
Product markets were in transition and did not build upon
TCC's existing strengths in the square timber industry. Technological innovation affected TCC and its efforts to expand into
new products and maintain its competitive position. Thus, TCC
was facing changes in its organizational d o m a i n which increased uncertainty and required adaptation to new ways of
doing business. Endeavors into new technologies and markets
did not prove viable, supporting Haveman's [1992] proposition
Published by eGrove, 1993
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t h a t such efforts are less likely to succeed if they are not
grounded in existing organizational strengths. TCC initially began operations when the market and its related institutional
framework were more amenable to the entrepreneurial firm, as
exemplified by the many early entrants into the timber industry.
The death of D. D. Calvin left the term at a crossroads. Faced
with increased competition, and without adequate h u m a n resources, TCC was not positioned to confront the new challenges
posed by the changes in the timber trade and by the technological advances of the late-nineteenth century. For example, TCC's
management had sought to change course via greater investment in more efficient equipment. This option was delayed, and
later poorly implemented, due to the concurrent policy of paying out the major share of earnings as dividends. The increasing
scale and scope of business implied concomitant adaptations in
the administration and control of business organizations. The
shift from a partnership to a corporation brought with it the
privilege of limited liability, but also certain duties towards its
shareholders. Incorporation also meant new requirements in
terms of accounting which could not be met by the accounting
methods of the partnership.
Organizational culture, specifically the family style of business, was an important factor in TCC's evolution. TCC's situation reinforces McCalla's [1979, 1984] findings concerning the
reliance on family ties and close business associates; personal
trust being the basis for many business transactions. It also
supports the work of Flamholtz [1983] and Ouchi [1979, 1980]
with respect to the role of socialization and clan mechanisms as
part of the management control system. The family style of
business was reflected in TCC's operations and in its accounting
for them. The close involvement of partners reduced the need
for the calculation of the firm's net worth and profitability. Periodic assessment by the partners was possible through direct
examination of the actual accounting records. No dissolution
took place from 1854 to 1880, eliminating the need to determine
partners' wealth as at dissolution or the commencement of a
new partnership. It also permitted TCC to retain its long-run
concept of profit. However, the latter changed significantly in
the later stages of the company.
During TCC's first phase, the long-term view of profit was
maintained, but the weaknesses of this perspective were becoming evident. The limitations possibly were related to the length
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3
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of the partnership. Calvin and Breck remained partners for approximately thirty years, such that TCC would have been described more aptly as an ongoing business, rather than as a
series of joint ventures. These limitations became more obvious
during the second period of TCC, especially with the adoption
of corporate status. The emergence of a short-run focus also
was revealed by increased attention to the balance sheet. The
latter was not independent of the role of family members in the
firm, and their remuneration. For example, with the entry of
Hiram Calvin in the 1870s, the profit figure had to be allocated
among three individuals; yet their financial position and interests conflicted.
The reliance on homogeneous beliefs and family ties was
threatened upon incorporation and contributed to TCC's decline. While operating in outward form as a limited company, in
substance, TCC remained a family business. TCC's waning years
were ones of missed opportunities. TCC's dividend policy, which
led to the erosion of its capital base, contributed to the latter.
The payment of dividends (which were roughly double the ret u r n generated in the firm) lends support to the argument that
TCC's decline was due, in part, to its unsuccessful shift from a
family business to a business enterprise. The firm was utilized
as a means to provide for family members who received dividends (and in some cases salaries) from the firm, TCC was left
without the capital required to sustain its place in the market.
TCC's experience reinforces the argument of Bliss [1987] that
family firms often failed to develop managerial expertise, instead relying upon family ties and tradition. Indeed, the comments of Bliss [1987, pp. 352-353] are appropriate here:
The secret of making the transition from builder-promoter-entrepreneur was to find ways of bringing the
business under accounting control, if only by hiring
people who could, . . . not just to produce a clear sense
of where each department was going, but to use the
accounts to unleash the energies of managers and employees whose responsibility for their performance
could be clearly traced and measured, no matter how
big the organization.
The competitive environment of the twentieth century required
the ability to control its ventures, but, significantly, also the
ability to control those responsible for them.
The research results affirm the need to consider accounting
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within its environmental context. While the study is limited to
one firm, the effect of rapid technological change, competitive
pressures and new financial and organizational arrangements
have parallels with present-day organizational experience. TCC's
case provides insights to assess the potential outcome of attempts to deal with current challenges. As noted by Previts et al
[1990, p. 7], historical studies "specify social and economic conditions that influence existing and proposed practice techniques, enhancing our ability to evaluate competing techniques
as suitable for the current environment and circumstances."
Moreover, current research into management control perhaps
needs to incorporate a longer time frame in order to understand
the role of the accounting system, and to assess the influence of
social, economic, and institutional forces.
Accounting's implication in the assessment of perceived organizational possibilities cannot be disregarded in the formulation of theoretical prescriptions for accounting practice. TCC's
example demonstrates the unintended consequences of innovations and of the accounting's systems efforts to account for
them. Thus accounting researchers may achieve greater success
with and acceptance of their theories by providing conditional
prescriptions in terms of the particular organizational context.
For example, organizational size and culture differ across firms,
yet their effect may be circumscribed by other overriding environmental forces.
Future research is necessary to determine to what extent
TCC's experience was similar to that of other firms of the period. This would improve our understanding of organizational
and accounting change and provide additional insights for developing more broadly-based theory. Finally, the differences between the proprietary and entity view of accounting, as demonstrated within TCC, merit further attention. In TCC's later years,
the accounting equation had been changed theoretically from
Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Equity to Assets = Equities, highlighting the separation of the owner from the entity or organization. The increasing importance of the corporate form and the
role of the shareholder versus proprietor/partner contributed to
this shift in perspective. Profit was no longer a long-run change
in wealth, but net income, i.e., revenues less expenses. It may be
fruitful to reexamine these differences in terms of recent research into foundational issues.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3

26

McWatters: Evolution of the profit concept: One organization's experience
McWatters: The Evolution of the Profit Concept

57

REFERENCES
Amigoni, F., "Planning Management Control Systems", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (Autumn, 1978).
B h i m a n i , A., "Indeterminancy And The Specificity Of Accounting Change:
Renault 1898-1938", Accounting Organizations and Society, Volume 18,
N u m b e r 1 (1993).
Bliss, M., Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business, McClelland
and Stewart, Toronto, Canada (1987).
Boyd, M. C , The Story Of Garden Island, Brown & Martin Limited, Kingston,
Canada (1983).
Burns, T. and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, Tavistock Press,
London, Great Britain (1961).
Brief, R. P., Nineteenth Century Capital Accounting And Business
Investment,
Arno Press, New York, N.Y. (1976).
Bruns Jr., W. J. and J. H. Waterhouse, "Budgetary Control And Organization
Structure", Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 13, Number 2 (Autumn
1975).
The Calvin Collection, The Marine M u s e u m Of The Great Lakes (MMA),
Kingston, Ontario.
The Calvin Company Papers, Queen's University Archives (QUA), Kingston,
Ontario.
Calvin, D. D., A Saga Of The St. Lawrence, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, Canada
(1945).
Delacroix, J. and A. Swaminathan, "Cosmetic, Speculative, And Adaptive Organizational Change In The Wine Industry: A Longitudinal Study", Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 36 (December 1991).
Dent, J. F., "Strategy, Organization And Control: Some Possibilities For Accounting Research", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 15,
N u m b e r 1/2 (1990).
Drazin, R., and A. H. Van de Ven, "Alternative Forms Of Fit In Contingency
Theory", Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 30 (December 1985).
Edwards, J. R., "The Process Of Accounting Innovation: The Publication Of
Consolidated Accounts In Britain In 1910", The Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 18, Number 2 (1991).
Flamholtz, E. G., "Accounting, Budgeting And Control Systems In Their Organizational Context: Theoretical And Empirical Perspectives", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 8, Number 2/3 (1983).
Gordon, L. A. and D. Miller, "A Contingency Framework For The Design Of
Accounting Information Systems", Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Volume 1, Number 1 (1976).
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayan, "Management Accounting Systems, Perceived
Environmental Uncertainty And Organization Structure", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 9, Number 1 (1984).
Govindarajan, V., "Appropriateness Of Accounting Data In Performance Evaluation: An Empirical Examination Of Environmental Uncertainty As An Intervening Variable", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 9, Number
2 (1984).
Govindarajan, V. and A. K. Gupta, "Linking Control Systems To Business Unit
Strategy: Impact On Performance", Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Volume 10, Number 1 (1985).

Published by eGrove, 1993

27

58

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 3

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1993

Gresov, C., "Exploring Fit And Misfit With Multiple Contingencies", Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 34 (September 1989).
Haveman, H. A., "Between A Rock And A Hard Place: Organizational Change
And Performance Under Conditions Of Fundamental Environmental Transformation", Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 37 (March 1992).
Hopwood, A., "The Archaeology Of Accounting Systems", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, Number 3 (1987).
Khandwalla, P. N., "The Effects Of Different Types Of Competition On The Use
Of Management Controls", Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 10,
Number 2 (Autumn 1972).
Kim, K. K., "Organizational Coordination And Performance In Hospital Accounting Information Systems: An Empirical Investigation", The Accounting
Review, Volume LXIII, Number 3 (July 1988).
Lawrence, P. R. and J. W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment;
Managing
Differentiation and Integration, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
(1967).
Littleton, A. C., Accounting Evolution To 1900, Atheneum Publishers, Inc. (reissue), New York, N.Y. (1966).
Lower, A. R. M., "The Trade in Square Timber" [1933] in Easterbrook, W. T. &
Watkins, M. H. (editors), Approaches To Canadian Economic
History,
Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Ontario (1984).
MacNeal, K., Truth In Accounting, Scholars Book Company (reissue), Lawrence,
Kansas (1970).
Mann, H., The Evolution Of Accounting In Canada, Touche Ross & Company,
Montreal, P. Q. (1972).
Markus, M. L. and J. Pfeffer, "Power And The Design And Implementation Of
Accounting And Control Systems", Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Volume 8, Number 2/3 (1983).
McCalla, D., The Upper Canada Trade: A Study of the Buchanan's Business, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada (1979).
McCalla, D., "An Introduction To The Nineteenth-Century Business World" in
Traves, T. (ed.), Essays In Canadian Business History, McClelland & Stewart
Limited, Toronto, Canada (1984).
McInnis, R. M., "From Hewn Timber To Sawn Lumber", Eighth International
Economic History Congress (August 1982).
Merchant, K., "The Design Of The Corporate Budgeting System: Influences On
Managerial Behavior And Performance", The Accounting Review, Volume
LVI, Number 4 (October 1981).
Merchant, K., "Influences On Departmental Budgeting: An Empirical Examination Of A Contingency Model", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volu m e 9, Number 3/4 (1984).
MMA (See The Calvin Collection, above).
Norman, C,. "A Company Community: Garden Island, Upper Canada at MidCentury", in Akenson, D., (ed.), Canadian Papers in Rural History, Volume 2,
Langdale Press, Gananoque, Canada (1980).
Otley, D. and Wilkinson, C., "Organizational Behavior: Strategy, Structure, Environment, And Technology", in Ferris, K. R. (ed.). Behavioral
Accounting
Research: A Critical Analysis, Century VII Publishing Company, Columbus,
Ohio (1988).

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/3

28

McWatters: Evolution of the profit concept: One organization's experience
McWatters: The Evolution of the Profit Concept

59

Ouchi, W. G., "A Conceptual Framework For The Design Of Organizational Control Systems", Management Science, Volume 25, N u m b e r 9 (September
1979).
Ouchi, W. G., "Markets, Bureaucracies, And Clans", Administrative
Science
Quarterly, Volume 25 (March 1980).
Pennings, J. M., "Structural Contingency Theory", in Staw, B. M. and L. L.
Cummings, Research In Organizational Behavior, Volume 14, JAI Press Inc.,
Greenwich, CT (1992).
Previts, G. J., Parker, L. D. and E. N. Coffman, "Accounting History: Definition
and Relevance", ABACUS, Volume 26, Number 1 (1990).
QUA (See The Calvin Company Papers, above).
Simons, R., "Accounting Control Systems And Business Strategy: An Empirical
Analysis", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, N u m b e r 4
(1987).
Simons, R., "The Role Of Management Control Systems In Creating Competitive
Advantage: New Perspectives", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volu m e 15, N u m b e r 1/2 (1990).
Swainson, D., Garden Island: A Shipping Empire, Marine Museum Of The Great
Lakes, Kingston, Canada (1984).
Van Maanen, J. and E. H. Schein, "Towards A Theory Of Organizational Socialization", in Staw, B. M. (ed.), Research In Organizational Behavior, Volume
I, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT (1979).
Waterhouse, J. H. and P. Tiessen, "A Contingency Framework For Management
Accounting Systems Research", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volu m e 3, N u m b e r 2 (1978).
Williams, J. J., Macintosh, N. B. and J. C. Moore, "Budget Related Behavior In
Public Sector Organizations: Some Empirical Evidence", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 15, Number 3 (1990).
Woodward, J., Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice, Oxford University
Press, London, Great Britain (1965).

Published by eGrove, 1993

29

60

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 3
The Accounting

Historians Journal, December 1993

APPENDIX 1
The Calvin Company Copartnerships
1839
1843
1844

1846
1847
1850

1851
1854
1855

1873
1877
1880
1884
1886

Calvin Cook & Counter organized December 1839.
Departure of Counter at close of year.
C. E. Dunn enters partnership with l/6th share.
Business known as Calvin Cook & Co. at Garden Island, and Dunn
Calvin & Co. at Quebec.
Opening of Hamilton branch, Hiram Cook & Co.
C. E. Dunn leaves partnership at end of year.
T. H. Dunn replaces his brother effective January 1st.
T. H. Dunn leaves partnership at June 1850. Calvin and Cook divide
their interests.
Quebec branch becomes D. D. Calvin & Co., other names unchanged.
I. A. Breck assumes a 25% interest in Calvin's business in January.
Calvin and Cook formally dissolve partnership.
Calvin and Breck formally recognize 1851 agreement. New partnership
known as Calvin & Breck at Garden Island, Quebec branch n a m e unchanged.
H. A. Calvin purchases a 2 5 % interest from his father.
H. A. Calvin transfers his share back to his father.
Breck retires. H. A. Calvin reenters firm, but with payment of salary in
lieu of share in profits. Firm renamed Calvin & Son.
D. D. Calvin dies, and his estate divided amongst heirs.
The firm reorganized as a limited-liability company in June 1886. The
new company called The Calvin Company Limited.
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APPENDIX 2
The Calvin Company Operations
DEMAND

SUPPLY

Quebec

Garden Island
River Rafting

Western Operations
Lake Freighting

Sell At Quebec
Ship On Own Account

Great Britain
Raft Construction
Shipbuilding
Sail Loft
Merchandise A/C (Co. Store)
Bakehouse
Boarding House
Tug Line Service

Timber Sources
Make Or Buy
Joint Accounts
Shanty Operations

The Timber Operating Cycle
Fall/Winter

Winter

Spring

Decision to
buy/maker
timber
Contracts for
sale of upcoming
season's output.

Timber Shanty
Operations

Timber brought
to shipping
points. Lake
Freighting
begins.

Account Settlement
continues.

Settlement of
prior season's
accounts.

Late Spring/
Summer

Rafting from
Garden Island
starts.

Summer/Fall

Sales at Quebec
on bills of
exchange, or commission
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APPENDIX 3
The Calvin Company Return On Capital — 1862 to 1886 *
Year

Y/E Capital (1)

Profit (2)

1862

$160,724.53

$33,348.08

26.18

1863

216,413.58

43,608.87

25.24

1864

232,795.79

33,677.69

16.90

1865

250,020.57

18,445.92

7.97

1866

268,376.62

20,731.96

8.37

1867

305,336.21

37,243.57

13.89

1868

317,790.60

23,783.18

8.09

1869

362,618.76

47,975.93

15.25

1870

389,479.23

40,268.30

11.53

1871

356,137.46

54,389.22

18.02

1872

483,095.21

45,875.98

10.49

1873

534,161.11

56,492.14

11.83

1874

527,946.29

8,240.24

1.59

1875

522,828.79

(11,355.18)

(2.13)

1876

527,456.44

2,649.13

0.50

1877

493,557.54

(8,515.79)

(1.70)

1878

405,474.30

(79,849.59)

(16.45)

1879

316,133.82

(91,503.63)

(22.45)

1880

305,613.56

37,186.67

13.85

1881

316,337.55

15,503.98

5.15

1882

526,091.00

27,689.08

5.56

1883

507,963.99

16,912.06

3.44

1884

509,655.24

(12,438.50)

(2.38)

1885

495,660.46

40,943.13

9.00

1886

508,368.83

11,279.07

2.27

R O C = 2/(1-2)

Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes.
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APPENDIX 4
Dividend Policy — The Calvin Company
1887 to 1915
TOTAL PROFIT DECLARED
TOTAL LOSSES DECLARED

$ 172,827.00
186,060.84

BALANCE OF LOSSES
OVER PROFIT

$ (13,233.84)

TOTAL PROFIT DECLARED
LESS DIVIDENDS

$ 172,827.00
132,300.00

BALANCE OF PROFIT
OVER DIVIDENDS
TOTAL LOSSES DECLARED

$

DEFICIT ACCOUNT AT
DECEMBER 1915

DIVIDENDS AS A % OF PROFIT DECLARED:
TOTAL LOSSES TO TOTAL PROFIT:
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40,527.00
186,060.84

$(145,533.84)

76.55%
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APPENDIX 5
Dividend Payment versus Liquid Assets*

Year

Dividend
Payment (1)

1888

Liquid Assets (2)
before dividend

Excess of 1
as % of 2**

$6,300.00

2,625.58

139.95

1889

9,450.00

5,054.67

86.96

1890

9,450.00

2,288.44

312.95

1891

—

5,976.46

—

1892

7,875.00

4,015.18

96.13

1893

6,300.00

6,362.08

(0.99)

1894

3,937.50

6,560.45

(39.98)

1895

6,300.00

1,101.46

471.97

1896

7,087.50

2,685.76

163.89

1897

9,450.00

6,458.26

46.32

1898

9,450.00

7,749.10

21.95

1899

6,300.00

4,846.41

29.99

1900

9,450.00

5,462.89

72.99

1901

7,875.00

2,880.50

173.39

1902

5,512.50

3,747.47

47.10

1903

6,300.00

3,100.75

103.18

1904

5,512.50

3,117.75

76.81

1905

6,300.00

657.17

858.66

1906

6,300.00

965.81

552.30

1907

3,150.00

2,736.80

15.10

* Liquid Assets = (Cash + Bills Receivable)
** Average = 169.93% (σ = 222.09, n=19)
Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes.
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APPENDIX 6
Profit Analysis — 1887 to 1915
Year E n d

Return on Capital

Net Assets

Surplus (Deficit)

—

1887

0.20

$157,810.42

1888

4.36

158,063.39

563.39

1889

6.03

157,554.24

54.24

1890

21.22

181,476.05

23,976.05

1891

(8.69)

167,793.77

10,293.77

1892

5.00

167,803.06

10,303.06

1893

3.34

166,846.77

9,346.77

1894

0.65

163,936.96

6,436.96

1895

4.06

164,025.11

6,525.11

1896

5.72

165,939.95

8,439.95

1897

10.33

172,764.74

15,264.74

1898

7.58

175,249.33

17,749.33

1899

5.06

176,911.18

19,411.18

1900

7.32

178,995.58

21,495.58

1901

10.02

186,911.16

29,411.16

1902

1.27

183,397.36

25,897.36

1903

4.39

184,017.27

26,517.27

1904

1.14

180,304.29

22,804.29

1905

4.05

180,389.62

22,889.62

1906

0.38

174,682.31

17,182.31

1907

2.27

180,089.29

22,589.29

1908

(6.47)

169,891.33

12,391.33

1909

(6.32)

159,931.09

2,431.09

1910

1.13

161,707.54

4,207.54

1911

(29.24)

115,649.74

(41,850.26)

1912

1.57

118,128.72

(39,371.28)

1913

(8.73)

104,383.91

(53,116.09)

1914

(50.21)

25,304.47

(132,195.53)

1915

(8.47)

11,916.16

(145,533.84)

Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes.
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